Jerry Fodor and Christopher Peacocke on the theory of concepts

I. Introduction

One might think that if any concept could be considered recognitional — i.e. individuated at least in part by its recognitional properties — then the concept of red could. Not so, according to Jerry Fodor (1998a; 1998b), who rules out the existence of such epistemically individuated concepts in favour of his own informational semantics based account. This essay evaluates an alternative account of recognitional concepts by Christopher Peacocke (1992; 2000; 2005), one of the main proponents of the epistemic approach, along with some of Fodor’s objections to it. In Section II, I set out the main points of Peacocke’s theory, including the possession conditions that he specifies for <red>.1 In Section III, I evaluate Fodor’s main criticism of this account, namely that it fails to account for compositionality; i.e. our ability to grasp complex concepts like <red apple> by understanding their constituent concepts, i.e. <red> and <apple>, due to the difference between an object’s forming part of the extension of a complex concept and being a ‘good instance’ of it (Fodor 1998b: 10). Finally, in Section IV, I present Peacocke’s response to these criticisms before finally concluding that <red> is, after all, a recognitional concept, subject to some further philosophical and metaphysical concerns.

Before addressing the details of Peacocke’s theory, it is necessary to clarify the relevant notion of a concept. In contrast to the everyday usage of this term, the philosophical notion of a concept is that of a basic constituent or element of thought or language from which propositional (and possibly perceptual) content is comprised. This covers not only types, such as <apple>, <fish>, <water> etc., but connectives, qualities, relations, demonstratives, indexicals and proper names, to mention but a few. Concepts may be simple, e.g. <animal>, or complex, e.g. <pet fish>, in virtue of being linguistically and semantically analysable into their constituent concepts, e.g. <pet> and <fish>, plus a suitable mode of composition — in this case predication.2 In addition to accounting for such systematic compositionality, Fodor and Peacocke agree that any theory of concepts must respect Evans’s (1982: 100–5) Generality Constraint; i.e. that any subject who is capable of thinking that a is F, where F indicates some concept possessed by the subject, must also be capable of thinking that a is G, where G is any other concept of which the subject can conceive. For example, nobody who is able to grasp the sentence ‘the car is red’ would be unable to grasp ‘the car is green’ or ‘the apple is red’, provided that they possess the concepts <green> or <apple>, respectively (cf. Peacocke 1983: 1). Conversely, any loss of the ability to understand these concepts would result in a corresponding systematic loss of the ability to entertain propositions within which they feature (Evans 1982: 102).

Fodor (1998b: 1) defines a recognitional concept as any concept that (i) ‘is at least partly constituted by its possession conditions’ and (ii) whose possession conditions include ‘the ability to recognize at least some things that fall under the concept as things that fall under the concept’. In other words, a concept which is partially defined or individuated by the sensitivity of subjects to recognise instances of that concept. I will examine how this definition applies to Peacocke’s account of <red>, whose possession conditions involve the exercise of precisely such an ability, in Section III after setting out the main features of his account below.

II. Peacocke’s Theory

According to Peacocke, concepts are individuated by their possession conditions. That is, a concept’s identity conditions, i.e. what makes it that concept rather than another, are fixed by the conditions that determine whether a subject possesses the concept, rather than — as has traditionally been assumed — the other way round (Peacocke 2000: 328). In many cases, including the logical constants (&, ∨, →, etc.), these conditions simply list the set of inferences that the subject finds ‘primitively compelling’ (Peacocke 1992: 6), thus explaining the connection between a subject’s possessing a concept and the rational (i.e. truth-preserving) inferences that it permits them to make (Peacocke 2005: 170). Indeed, Peacocke rightly considers this to be an important task for any theory of concepts and rationality. Possession conditions may, however, involve conditions other than a concept’s inferential role (Peacocke 1992: 7). Peacocke specifies the possession conditions for <red>, for example, in terms of a thinker’s having the following dispositions:

1. 1.‘[T]o believe a content that consists of a singular perceptual-demonstrative mode of presentation m in predicational combination with C when the perceptual experience that makes m available presents its object in a red′ region of the subject’s visual field […] in conditions he takes to be normal, and [where] he takes his perceptual mechanisms to be working properly.’
   

2. 2.To form the appropriate belief as to why m is so presented.
   

3. 3.To believe of other objects that are capable of causing the kinds of experience necessary for (1), but which are not presented to the thinker, that they are C.
   

where C is satisfied by the abstract object <red> (ibid. 7–8).

The first of the above conditions does the bulk of the work by specifying <red> in terms of its combination with the Fregean ‘mode of presentation’ that arises when the subject sees an object in such a way that the experience exhibits the phenomenal property of redness (red′) within their visual field. At first glance, this mention of red′ in (1) might appear to be circular, since it defines the concept red in terms of a subject’s having a visual experience of red. However, since the analysans (<red>) is a concept and the analysandum (red′) a phenomenal property, Peacocke escapes the obvious circularity by defining the concept red in terms of the property red′, which he takes to be conceptually and experientially prior to <red>. Indeed, Peacocke argues that provided the concept being analysed does not appear within the scope of a ‘that’ clause specifying the content of a propositional attitude held by the subject, it is perfectly legitimate for its definition to mention that concept without fear of circularity (ibid. 9). He justifies this by pointing out that it would be unnecessary for a subject to already possess the concept of red in order for them to meet the above possession conditions, since red′ is taken to be a feature of normal human experience (ibid. 8). Whether there are any such phenomenal properties and whether they can be individuated without reference to the corresponding concepts, however, remain important questions for Peacocke’s account, as Fodor (1995: 32) points out, although this issue does not form the focus of the dispute between them. Peacocke’s theory is, in any case, flexible enough to allow the phenomenal property red′ to be replaced by a suitable reference to the metaphysical property, red, in keeping with Fodor’s (1998a: 73) own information theoretic approach.

Another notable feature of (1) is that it references a set of normal conditions, including the proper functioning of the subject’s visual faculties. This rules out someone’s possessing <red> as a result of, for example, direct electrical stimulation of their brain, or by sensations experienced in non-standard lighting conditions. Interestingly, Peacocke’s account does not actually require the conditions to be normal, but merely that the subject takes them to be so. This is presumably to avoid any circularity that would result from the concept’s possession conditions referring to the experience of a typical subject, which would itself require the same condition to be satisfied, and so on ad infinitum. However, the fact that the experience must be one of red′ is already sufficiently normative to avoid the generation of bizarre counterexamples that take advantage of this discrepancy. That what constitutes ‘normal conditions’ is an epistemic rather than metaphysical condition, and so may vary between one concept and another, will become important when considering how such conditions apply to cases of compositionality.

Conditions (2) and (3) qualify (1) by requiring that the subject be disposed to identify (where appropriate) the cause of his experience as being due to seeing something ‘red’, even for objects that are not, or may never be, visually present. Whilst Peacocke does not spell out the precise content of the relevant belief in (2), it presumably relates to the subject’s having seen a red-looking object, or perhaps the properties of the object that cause it to give rise to the phenomenal experience of red′. Here, as in (1), circularity would be avoided by mentioning the concept via the variable C, since any further use of <red> would fall foul of Peacocke’s restriction upon the concept appearing within the scope of a propositional attitude clause, as described above. In the case of subjects who are not capable of forming such beliefs since they lack the requisite cognitive faculties, e.g. young children or lower animals, Peacocke argues that it is sufficient that they would be disposed to form such beliefs were they to acquire the requisite faculties — as is the case with older children, for example. This is something of a moot point in the case of animals since there is no way to test the hypothesis, but it serves to emphasise the fact that Peacocke’s account of <red> is essentially dispositional, and does not require the subject to form the relevant belief in every case, or even to be capable of representing predicate structure (cf. Peacocke 1992: 8). Condition (3) caters for the fact that unobserved objects may also be red, since causing red′ sensations is a sufficient, but not necessary, condition for redness. If this condition were omitted then it would lead to the obviously implausible conclusion (pace Berkeley) there are no unobserved or unobservable red objects as a matter of a priori necessity (ibid. 20).

According to Peacocke, (1) through (3) constitute the complete set of possession conditions for <red>, and thereby individuate the concept. In order to determine whether something is red or not, a subject must exercise the epistemic capacities specified within these possession conditions, such as judging whether an object is presented in a red′ region of their visual field, thus enabling them to assign the appropriate semantic value (e.g. true or false) to propositions that involve <red>.3 The way in which the semantic value of a concept may be derived from its possession conditions is known as its ‘determination theory’ (ibid. 17). Although the details of this theory may vary according to the concept in question, it will in each case be both consistent with, and permit the subject to form true beliefs or inferences in accordance with, that concept’s possession conditions (ibid. 19).4 The correct exercise of the epistemic capacities specified by the determination theory for <red>, along with the state of the world at some particular time, will thus yield a true judgement as to, for example, whether or not some particular object is red. In this way, the semantic and empirical content of a concept is defined by a combination of its possession conditions plus the appropriate determination theory (ibid. 17).

The main strength of the above theory is undoubtedly its ability to explain the close connection between the possession a concept and the truth-preserving inferences that it enables a rational subject to make, since the two are, on Peacocke’s view, fundamentally interrelated through the concept’s possession conditions (see Peacocke 2000: 332). This in turn explains how the acquisition of a new concept enables a subject to carry out a wide range of valid inferences involving that concept, as the Generality Constraint requires, as well as the essential role that concepts play in our general ability to think and reason. However, Peacocke’s theory ties the possession conditions and determination theories of most (if not all) concepts to the epistemic or recognitional capacities of a rational subject. It is this aspect of the theory to which Fodor takes exception, causing him to rule out the existence of any such recognitional concepts — including <red>.

III. Fodor’s Critique

Before addressing the main thrust of Fodor’s critique, it will be useful to examine precisely how the above account relates to the definition of a recognitional concept given in Section I. Since the possession conditions for <red> involve only dispositions to form <red>-beliefs, whereas Fodor’s definition requires the ability to recognise things that fall under the concept as being red, it could be argued that <red> is not a recognitional concept, since (i) a subject may fulfil the relevant possession conditions without actually forming the belief that some object is red, and (ii) subjects need not possess the cognitive capacity required to form the relevant beliefs, as described above in the case of animals or young children. In general, however, the disposition to form <red>-beliefs under the circumstances specified by (1) does presuppose the ability to recognise red objects in virtue of the phenomenal property that they cause within the subject’s visual field. Since Fodor is opposed to any reference to epistemic capacities in explaining what ‘constitutes’ such concepts (Fodor 1995: 31), Peacocke’s definition clearly falls within the spirit, if not the letter, of the above definition.

Turning to the the main point, both Peacocke and Fodor take it that compositionality — i.e. the ability of rational subjects to grasp complex concepts simply in virtue of grasping their constituent concepts — is an essential (although not sufficient [Peacocke 1983: 55]) feature of concepthood, and something that any successful theory of concepts should explain. Fodor claims that Peacocke’s theory is unable to do this for the following reason. A subject who grasps <red> and <apple>, along with the predicational mode of composition, should thereby be capable of grasping the complex <red apple>. Conversely, a subject who grasps <red apple> must, ipso facto, be in possession of its constituent concepts, namely <red> and <apple>.5 Fodor argues that this cannot be the case for recognitional concepts since the relevant epistemic capacities do not compose in the required manner. What it takes to recognise a ‘good instance’ of <red apple>, he argues, may well differ from what it takes to recognise ‘good instances’ of <red> and <apple>, meaning that the ability to recognise instances of the former concept cannot be ‘inherited’ from an understanding of the latter (1998b: 10). It would therefore be possible for a subject who grasped both <red> and <apple> to nevertheless fail to satisfy the possession conditions for <red apple>, since they lack the relevant recognitional capacity, thereby contravening the principle of compositionality.6

As Peacocke (2000: 337) points out, Fodor’s own example of <pet fish>, whilst dialectically appealing, does not constitute a counterexample to Peacocke’s theory of recognitional concepts since neither <pet> nor <fish> is plausibly recognitional. Nevertheless, the objection generalises since every putatively recognitional concept may be combined with other non-recognitional concepts to form other complex concepts — e.g. <red hair> — to which a similar objection would apply. Although the resulting concept may be non-recognitional, its possession conditions arguably do not include the recognitional ability for red′, since red hair is not literally red, but rather reddish — or, to put it another way, red for hair (cf. ibid. 338). As such, the principle of compositionality appears to have been violated unless another explanation for the discrepancy can be found.

Peacocke responds to this objection by citing two kinds of cases in which the above situation can occur, but which nevertheless do not constitute a counterexample to the compositionality (ibid.). The first involves cases where the possession conditions for a non-standard mode of composition — in this case <for> — must also be taken into account. In order for a complex concept to be recognitional, each of its components must also be recognitional. Since <for> is not a recognitional concept, any complex concept, such as <red hair>, that involves it will also be non-recognitional, even if all of its other constituents (i.e. <red> and <hair>) are recognitional. In such cases, any additional epistemic content comes from applying the determination theory of the relevant mode of composition (i.e. <for>), and not from the fact that semantics ‘runs a barber shop’, as Fodor (1998b: 10) mischievously suggests. The possession conditions for <red hair> will, therefore, include the relevant elements of (1), but in a modified form due to their having been ‘multiplied out’ (Peacocke 2005: 173) — i.e. combined according to their semantic content, rather than simply being listed as a set of criteria — by the possession conditions for <for> and <hair>. The resulting non-recognitional concept can therefore be grasped by the possession conditions of its constituent concepts, as compositionality requires, even though its instances will not necessarily be recognisable this way.

The second way in which Peacocke suggests that complex concepts and recognitional abilities can come apart concerns what constitutes the normal conditions for recognising instances of each concept. Even in cases where the mode of composition is straightforwardly predicational, as with <red apple>, the conditions conducive to recognising, for example, red things (or apples) may plausibly differ from those conducive to the recognition of red apples. This may sound like a mere restatement of Fodor’s original objection in the <pet fish> case in that it involves a situation where the possession of a recognitional ability for each of the constituent concepts appears to be insufficient for recognising instances of the complex concept. However, this problem does not arise at the level of possession conditions, since the relevant conditions, e.g. (1), do not specify precisely what constitutes the normal conditions for recognising instances of that concept, but rather appeal to the independent knowledge of the thinker, as previously noted. Moreover, it may — in principle, at least — be determined in advance whether the conditions for recognising instances of the relevant constituent concepts are in fact compatible, and thus whether the resulting complex concept will be recognitional or non-recognitional. In the former case, where the normal conditions are compatible, the compositionality of both possession and recognition conditions will be respected, and so the relevant epistemic capacities will compose. In the latter, the resulting concept will be non-recognitional, and so does not present a counterexample to the principle of compositionality for recognitional concepts (Peacocke 2000: 339).7

Peacocke’s response to Fodor is therefore that, barring special cases that arise from the use of non-predicational modes of composition and conflicting recognition conditions, all simple recognitional concepts, when combined with other recognitional concepts or modes of composition to form complex recognitional concepts, obey the principle of compositionality (ibid. 340). Furthermore, even in these special cases, the possession conditions of such concepts (including the relevant mode of composition) combine in such a way that the compositionality of the relevant concepts’ possession conditions is respected. It is therefore essential to Peacocke’s theory that there are no cases in which a complex concept’s possession conditions do not contain each element of its constituent concepts’ possession conditions, since such a case would represent a counterexample to the theory. This is, perhaps difficult to evaluate in the absence of specifications for the possession conditions of many everyday concepts — something that Peacocke can justifiably be criticised for failing to provide, and which Fodor is doubtful could ever be achieved in practice (Fodor 1995: 31). Whilst this may count against Peacocke’s theory of concepts in general, in the absence of any convincing counterexample, it seems at least plausible that this should be the case, particularly with regard to recognitional concepts, such as <red>, for the reasons given above.

IV. Conclusion

I have argued that <red> is a recognitional concept since, on Peacocke’s account at least, its possession conditions plausibly involve the exercise of epistemic capacities, such as the ability to recognise red′ regions of one’s visual field. One consequence of this account is that it requires the existence of such phenomenal properties or sensations as red′, along with those ‘primitively compelling’ inferences that define the logical constants and other non-recognitional concepts. This may seem metaphysically extravagant since the properties and inferences in question mirror the very concepts that such a theory might itself be expected to explain. This objection is not, however, decisive since even rival non-epistemic theories, such as Fodor’s own account, must posit the existence of suitable metaphysical properties to which each of our concepts refer, and so have comparable (although different) ontological commitments.

Fodor’s criticism of the ability of Peacocke’s theory to account for compositionality is unsuccessful since the possession conditions that individuate recognitional concepts such as <red> do in fact compose, provided that the relevant mode of composition is taken into consideration (although whether the same applies to other non-recognitional concepts remains undecided). The theory also explains our ability to apply new concepts in conjunction with, for example, demonstrative concepts in accordance with Evans’s Generality Constraint, which is itself derivable from Peacocke’s theory that concepts are individuated by their possession conditions (Peacocke 1992: 48). Indeed, such demonstrative concepts arguably form an important class of recognitional concepts in their own right. Perhaps a more damaging and fundamental objection to this theory arises from Quine and Fodor’s rejection of the analytic–synthetic distinction (Fodor 1995: 33–4). However, since this issue lies beyond the limited scope of this essay, I conclude — for present purposes at least — in favour of the intuitively plausible view that <red> is, after all, a recognitional concept.

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Bibliography

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—————  1998a: Concepts: Where Cognitive Science Went Wrong. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

—————  1998b: ‘There Are No Recognitional Concepts; Not Even RED’. Philosophical Issues 9: 1–14.

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—————  1992: A Study of Concepts. Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press.

—————  2000: ‘Fodor on Concepts: Philosophical Aspects’. Mind and Language, 15 (2), pp. 327–40.

—————  2005: ‘Rationale and Maxims in the Study of Concepts’. Noûs, 39, pp. 167–78.

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