An Analysis of the Form and Meaning of Happiness in Plato’s Republic

I. Introduction

One of the central claims of Plato’s Republic is that justice is not only desirable for its own sake, but that it maximises the happiness of those who practice it. This paper examines Plato’s arguments in support of this thesis to determine (a) what he means by happiness, (b) to what extent it exists in his proposed ideal state, and (c) whether this in any way substantiates his claims about the benefits of justice. In particular, I will argue that there are two different conceptions of happiness at play in The Republic, and two methods of achieving its highest form, namely the pursuit of justice and philosophy, before arriving at a final definition of the Platonic Form1 of happiness—a matter that Plato touches on only briefly in the text, but that is nevertheless central to his thinking on the subject.

II. Happiness and Pleasure

I will begin by considering the distinction between happiness and pleasure, and the language that Plato uses to describe the two. The word used most often in the text to describe happiness is eudaimonia, which may also be translated as ‘flourishing’ (Vlastos: 108). In contrast to the English word ‘happiness’, this suggests a ongoing process or activity, rather than a particular state of mind or emotion. However, it would be a mistake to read too much into this linguistic distinction as Plato uses eudaimonia more or less interchangeably with ‘pleasure’ (hēdonē), and it carries the same hedonistic connotations (ibid.). Unlike ‘happiness’, however, eudaimonia can be ascribed both to the state and the soul (psychē)2 in accordance with the central thesis of The Republic that these two entities share a common structure. Indeed, Socrates states several times that societal flourishing is more important than the happiness of any individual class or citizen (420b–421c, 519d–521a),3 implying that personal happiness is a means to an end rather than an end in its own right. This runs contrary to the tradition of ancient Greek thought, in which happiness is seen as the ultimate end and motivation behind all human activity (Vlastos: 108). This suggests that Plato has his own, more novel conception of happiness in mind.

Despite the lack of a consistent terminology, the distinction is made between pleasures of the flesh arising from bodily desires for food, sex, etc., and the superior pleasures of the intellect enjoyed by the guardian class (485d). Indeed, when Glaucon suggests that pleasure may be the Form of the good, he is soundly rebuked by Socrates who tells him to ‘Be silent … Do not even mention the word.’ (509a; cf. 505c). The descriptions of the pleasure seeking nature of democratic individuals (561b) and the just man, who pursues a balanced and harmonious lifestyle, not surrendering himself to ‘savage and unreasoning pleasure’ (591c) show that Plato’s view was that pursuit of happiness and pleasure for its own sake leads only to injustice and enslavement. This amounts to a clear condemnation of hedonism, and is illustrated by the example of the tyrant who is not only unhappy but is a ‘true slave’ to his own desires (579e).

In defence of pleasure, Plato has two different accounts to offer. The first arises from the distinction between ‘necessary’ and ‘unnecessary’ desires or appetites, which are said to produce corresponding types of pleasure (559c–d). The desire for bread and simple food, for example, is seen as both productive and necessary, whereas the desire for Sicilian à la carte and Attic pastries is considered extravagant, unnecessary and therefore to be avoided (404d).4 However, this distinction fails to take into account the happiness or pleasure of the philosopher, which cannot be described as ‘necessary’ in any ordinary sense, and so the analysis must be rejected as incomplete. This defect is resolved in the second account, which identifies three forms of pleasure that correspond to the three different elements of the soul: reason, spirit and appetite, or desire (580d). Here, the distinction between pleasures of the intellect and pleasure resulting from the pursuit of desire or honour—victory in war, for example—is clear, with the philosopher falling into the first category. However, although this provides us with a way of categorising pleasure, it does not bring us any closer to a theory of happiness, as there is no suggestion that it too has three different forms. From this I conclude that Plato considers the notion of pleasure to be insufficient as an explanation of happiness, and that these instead represent two different, but interrelated, concepts.

Happiness and Justice

In order to fully appreciate what Plato means by eudaimonia, we must instead consider the ways in which it is supposedly achieved: namely, through the twin pursuits of justice and philosophy. The first argument for this thesis is found at the end of Book 1 (352d–354a) where Socrates states that everything has both a characteristic function and a virtue (or excellence) that enables it to perform its function well. He goes on to say that living is the function of the soul, and justice its characteristic excellence, from which it follows that the just man lives well and is therefore happy. This is a classic piece of Socratic wordplay that relies upon a disputed, question-begging premise (justice being the virtue of the soul), two unsubstantiated assumptions (that the soul has both a function and an excellence) and equivocation (‘to live well’ is the same as ‘to be happy’), all of which renders it entirely unconvincing, even to his fictional audience (354c).5

A more plausible case for Plato’s thesis can be found in his analysis of the three classes of society and the corresponding types of individual that inhabit his hypothetical ideal state. When Adiemantus expresses concern over whether the ruling class will be happy with their lot (419a–420a), Socrates initially responds that the well-being of the city as a whole should outweigh that of any one class (420b–421c). However, since all of their needs are provided for by the state, the life of a guardian in the ruling class turns out to be ‘better by far than the life of victors in the Olympic games’ (466b), and far superior to that of any shoemaker, farmer or other skilled worker. Indeed, any guardian who gets ‘some idiotic adolescent notion of happiness into his head’ and begins to exhibit a desire for property and material possessions is automatically relegated to the productive class, where he is free to indulge his profit-loving nature along with the rest of the proletariat. In accordance with the three forms of pleasure described above, the happiness of each of these classes is said to arise from their characteristic love of wisdom, honour or profit, respectively, which is pursued under the guidance of reason in accordance with Plato’s notion of justice (586e–587a). Conversely, the unhappiness that results from the various degenerate forms of character and state presented in Books 8 and 9 is a direct consequence of their lack of justice (580c). Although his argument does indicate a certain correlation between justice and happiness, it does not explain why one necessarily leads to the other, and so again the analysis is incomplete. For a fuller explanation, we must turn to Plato’s third and most persuasive argument.

The centrepiece of The Republic is undoubtedly the definition of justice as the harmony of the parts of the soul or state in which each part performs its proper function under the command of reason (441e). Injustice, on the other hand is defined as ‘some sort of civil war’ between the parts of the soul (444a–b); a rebellion in which one rogue element—typically desire—usurps reason as the dominant power (ibid.). Plato goes on to liken justice to health and injustice to disease (444e), but this somewhat begs the question, as no rational person would choose to have an unhealthy soul (445a–b). However, there is more to this argument than first meets the eye. If injustice is the ‘civil war’ of the soul, then justice is characterised by peace and harmony between its elements. This notion of ‘psychic harmony’ is to the conventional conception of happiness what the Platonic definition of justice is to ordinary justice; i.e. it effectively redefines happiness in terms of its internal benefits and characteristics, as opposed to its external rewards and actions (Annas: 315). This in turn justifies Plato’s argument that the perfectly just man who nevertheless has a reputation for the greatest injustice and so receives none of its external benefits6 may still enjoy the greatest happiness. No matter what life throws at him, he never loses his inner composure, maintaining peace and tranquility throughout despite his apparently terrible circumstances. Although it is difficult for us to imagine such a person actually existing, Plato had first hand experience of this in the form of Socrates himself, who is said to have maintained perfect composure even in the face of death (Plato 1993: 118a). Although the point is not made explicit until Book 9 of The Republic, the idea that true happiness flows from precisely the same arrangement of the soul that produces justice is almost certainly what Plato had in mind (Pappas: 49). That he does not clarify the matter earlier may be because, having already redefined justice in Book 4, he does not want to open up the argument on a second front by going on to redefining happiness as well, and instead opts for the safer route of equating justice with ‘psychic health’—a concept which never the less suggests a strong connection with happiness.

III. Happiness and Philosophy

The second route to happiness described in The Republic is the pursuit of philosophy, and specifically philosophical contemplation of the Forms. This is held not only to produce the highest type of pleasure (that associated with reason), but also to mould one’s character in the image of what is eternal, beautiful and unchanging.7 It is portrayed as a state of such rapture that those who experience it will literally think they have died and gone to heaven (591c). But what evidence does Plato have to offer for the truth of these claims? In Book 9, we are told that the pleasures of the intellect are superior to the pleasures of desire or spirit on the basis that only those who have tasted all three are qualified to judge (582e). Since only the philosopher has experience of the Forms then her opinion is the only one that counts and, being a lover of wisdom, she of course prefers the philosophical life. This argument is unconvincing on the basis that the judgement appears to be subjectively biased in favour of the philosopher.8 However, again we are offered a second, more robust argument. The happiness of the profit-loving or honour-loving individual arises from the enjoyment of objects that belong to the impermanent physical world of ‘becoming’; i.e. that which ‘both is and is not’ (534a). Consequently, their pleasures are relative ones that consist of a mixture of both pain and pleasure, and are therefore matters of opinion and not of knowledge (584a). In contrast to this, the philosopher’s pleasure stems from contemplating the eternal and absolute world of ‘being’, or that which ‘is’ (477a), making it different not just in degree but also in kind. According to Plato, only knowledge of ‘being’ can lead to this true and certain pleasure (505d–e), which is in fact none other than the Platonic Form of happiness.

IV. The Form of Happiness

Having considered all the evidence, we are now in a position to define Plato’s theory of happiness as it is described in The Republic. Happiness in its pure or ideal Form is a state of absolute peace, joy and contentment that results from having a perfectly harmonious and balanced soul. This complete absence of inner conflict and turmoil effectively renders the individual immune to all forms of suffering, regardless of their physical circumstances. Such a state of mind may reliably be obtained in one of two ways. Firstly, by acquiring the virtue of justice, where each part of the soul is performing its proper function under the dominion of reason. Secondly, through the practice of philosophy, which brings the soul into equilibrium through the contemplation of what is eternal, beautiful and good. Conventional happiness, as with conventional justice, is a mere image or ‘shadow-picture’ (583b) of this Platonic ideal or Form that depends upon the pursuit of transient physical pleasures, and so is itself fleeting and unreliable, consisting at best of a temporary respite from pain and suffering. When described in this way, Platonic happiness bears a striking resemblance to the Buddhist notion of enlightenment—a word whose etymology would not have been lost on Plato—and other spiritual teachings of the East, which presumably both Plato and Socrates would have been exposed to.9 In each case, the important point is that far from depending upon external factors, true happiness arises from within as a result of cultivating the correct state of mind, and cannot be destroyed for as long as the individual continues to maintain their internal balance and harmony, even in the face of great adversity.

V. Conclusion

In conclusion then, our willingness to accept Plato’s definition of happiness depends upon our acceptance of the idea that what we call ‘happiness’ may in fact represent two different phenomena: (i) physical satisfaction or pleasure, and (ii) psychic harmony. That Plato seeks to redefine happiness rather than explain it in conventional terms is characteristic of his style of argument in The Republic, and indeed with the tradition of analytic philosophy, as well as being consistent with his notion of Forms. The resulting account not only contradicts ancient Greek thought but also more modern theories such as utilitarianism, which sees pleasure or happiness as more or less interchangeable, and a universal good that can be realised in any number of ways (Annas: 318). Although it may be unsurprising to hear a philosopher proclaim that justice and philosophy are the only true and reliable routes to happiness, when considered alongside his account of what happiness is and its benefits, these arguments confirm not only that Plato had a coherent theory of happiness, but that his views on the matter ‘are more profound than anything to be found in any utilitarian theory.’ (ibid.) Furthermore, his theory has much to teach us about the nature and importance of happiness in a predominantly pleasure seeking and desire-driven age.

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1 Although I am uncomfortable with the translation of the term ‘Form’, there seems little point in introducing an alternative, as it is now well established in the philosophical literature. Discerning readers may replace it with the term ‘Idea’ or ‘concept’ as they see fit.

2 The term ‘soul’ held much the same associations for Plato as the word ‘mind’, or its modern equivalent ‘psyche’ does for us today, and does not carry any particular religious or spiritual significance.

3 All references to the text of The Republic are given in Stephanus numbering; quotations are taken from the T Griffith translation listed in the bibliography.

4 Interestingly, sex is portrayed as an unnecessary desire, underlining Plato’s puritanical outlook, but presumably his logic could be extended to differentiate the necessary desire to bear offspring from he desire for ‘Corinthian girl friends’ (404d) or sexual love for a boy (403a).

5 Indeed, it is possible that Plato intends that his argument demonstrate the inadequacy of the Socratic elenchus in tackling such questions in order to pave the way for the more fundamental and far ranging account he subsequently provides (Pappas: 29–30).

6 As described by Glaucon in 361b–d.

7 Cf. the description of mathematics in 523a.

8 Although this did not stop J S Mill (1972: 9) using it in his account of utilitarianism. Indeed, Annas (308–310) argues that even though individual pleasures are themselves subjective, the judgement of the pleasantness of an entire life may still be an objective matter.

9 Indeed, many of the ideas expressed in The Republic (e.g. the Myth of Er) support this hypothesis, and Socrates was known to have practised a form of trance-like meditation from which he could not be roused.

Bibliography

Annas, Julia 1985: An Introduction to Plato’s Republic. Oxford: Oxford University Press

Mill, John Stuart 1972: Utilitarianism, On Liberty, Considerations on Representative Government. London: David Campbell Publishers Ltd.

Pappas, Nicolas 1995: Plato and the Republic, 2nd edition. London: Routledge

Plato 1993: ‘Phaedo’, The Last Days of Socrates. Translated by H Tredennick,
London: Penguin

————— 2000: The Republic. Ed. G Ferrari. Translated by T Griffith. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press

Vlastos, Gregory 1999: ‘Happiness and Virtue in Socrates’ Moral Theory’. In Plato 2, ed. G Fine. Oxford: Oxford University Press